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 ABSTRACT: The literature is addressed by tax competition to attract capital and the 
measures taken in this regard. These measures aim, in most cases, reducing tax rates. Most 
authors, especially the classics, believes that this reduction creates an underprovision of goods 
and services and addresses the problem in terms of their level. Very few scholars have revealed 
that this race to the bottom lead to a different structure in delivering public services. Thus, from 
the idea of Keen-Marchand (1997), this paper addresses this issue, using as basic data in the 
Romanian economy, through a regression model. The analysis results show that the race to 
reduce the tax burden, in which Romania joined in the impact of tax competition, leads to an 
underprovision welfare services aimed directly at a taxpayer and those aimed at infrastructure 
overprovision. 
 
 
 KEY  WORDS: tax competition; tax rates; public services. 
 
 
 JEL  CLASSIFICATION: H20; H71. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The literature on tax competition since Oates (Oates, 1972) and other classic 
works, such as those of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986, 
pp.356–370) and Wilson (Wilson, 1986, pp.296-315), focused largely on the effects of 
capital mobility public expenditure. While some authors have shown that tax 
competition can increase efficiency, most of the literature has tended to argue that tax 
and spending levels will be inefficiently low due to fiscal externalities mobile tax bases 
(Wilson, 1999, pp.269-304). 
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  In addition, tax competition may affect the composition (structure) of public 
goods provided. However, the issue of public expenditure structure was initially 
neglected. Keen and Marchand (Keen & Marchand, 1997, pp.33-53) addressed this 
issue and showed that, in the presence of mobile capital, tax competition tends to lead 
to an over-supply of resources and infrastructure to subfurnizare resources in those 
areas that directly affect consumer welfare such as social services. 
  The classic work on fiscal federalism, it is certainly a loss of wealth resulting 
from tax competition. Therefore, coordination both in terms of tax rates and in terms of 
public expenditure is a strong argument in the presence of competition for mobile 
factors. However, decentralization, especially in the first half of the '90s, was actively 
promoted as a necessary policy choice for many transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and characterized as a means of getting rid of excessive centralization 
and politicization of economic life. While international political debate turned to the 
institutional requirements for successful decentralization, the debate on the potential 
benefits of decentralization is far from complete.  
  Romania is one of those countries to promote decentralization to depoliticize 
economic life in its transition to a market economy. This article analyzes the structure 
of public services provided in Romania under the impact of tax competition, the race to 
the bottom affecting all economies under globalization impact. Model analysis is based 
on the Keen-Marchand model, providing different public services in the presence of 
tax competition and uses empirical data from the consolidated budget of Romania 
during 1995-2010. 
 
2. PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES IN ROMANIA AMID TAX 
COMPETITION 
 
  Starting from the idea of Keen-Marchand (Keen & Marchand, 1997, pp.33-53) 
by providing different public services in the presence of tax competition, we further 
examined this issue for Romania during 1995-2010, showing the impact of such 
competition on our country. In the analysis we used the following variables:  
-  Realized tax revenues (their share in GDP), as an independent variable. By this 
we caught the effect of tax rate reduction (the so-called "race-to-the-bottom", 
in which Romania joined in the current tax competition and globalization);  
-  Different categories of expenditure incurred (share in GDP), as dependent 
variables. By that, we surprised the public services provided and their structure 
in the presence of the race to the bottom in conditions of globalization. 
  In the analysis we used a linear regression model, as follows:  
 
      ( ) x f y =             (1) 
where:  
               ( ) x x f β α + =             (2) 
where:  
y - dependent variable, represented in this case, the share of public expenditure in GDP 
has made various, such as: general public services (denoted GSP), defence and national 
security policy (noted AOSN), education (denoted INV), health (denoted Ch_S),  
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culture (denoted Ch_C) Insurance (denoted Ch_Asig), public services and development 
(marked DP) and economic actions (denoted AEC);  
x - the dependent variable, represented by the share of tax revenues achieved in GDP 
(denoted AC);  
α, β - parameters of the regression equation. 
 
  For estimation we used the method of least squares, which requires the election 
of c1 and c2 as estimators of α and β's such that: 
 
       ()( ) ∑ − − =
2
2 1 2 1, i i x c c y c c W           (3) 
to be minimal. 
 
  Statistical description of the variables analyzed for the period 1995-2010 is 
shown below: 
 
Table 1. Statistical description of variables 
 
Sample: 1995 2010 
   VF  SPG  AOSN  INV  Ch_S  Ch_C  Ch_Asig  DP  AEC 
Mean  9.33324 1.564 2.5007 1.12 0.4433  0.274  2.007 0.3276 2.425 
Median  10.8643 0.947 2.9998 0.97 0.4745  0.3002  1.593 0.3644 2.677 
Maximum  15.8748 6.532 3.8867  2.8 0.5854  0.471  4.276 0.7852 4.328 
Minimum  1.61662  0 0.3219 0.27 0.1714  0.02  0.113 0.0244 0.446 
Std.  Dev.  3.81216 1.803 1.1402 0.65 0.1058  0.1347  1.384 0.2008 1.286 
Skewness  -0.65274 1.638 -0.719 1.01 -1.382  -0.4525  0.327 0.3189 -0.21 
Kurtosis  2.88115  4.8 2.2786 3.77 4.2341  2.1438  1.817 2.9452 1.596 
Jarque-
Bera 
1.14561 9.317 1.7261 3.09 6.1122  1.0348  1.218 0.2731 1.432 
Robability  0.56394 0.009 0.4219 0.21 0.0471  0.5961  0.544 0.8723 0.489 
Sum  149.332 25.03 40.011  18 7.0927  4.3839  32.11 5.2424 38.79 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
217.988 48.77 19.501 6.38 0.1679  0.2721  28.72  0.605 24.82 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews program and empirical data Statistical Yearbook of 
Romania (www.insse.ro) 
 
  Estimating parameters by the method mentioned above were obtained the 
following regression functions between the variables analyzed:  
 
1. Tax revenues and expenditures for general public services  
 
GSP = 0.051 + 0.162 * VF 
 
  This result shows that the change to a percentage of revenues in GDP, 
expenditure on general public services will change in the same direction as 0.162%. 
 
2. Tax revenues and expenditures for defense and national security policy  
 
AOSN = -0.032 + 0.271 * VF 
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  Regression equation allows us to make the following comments:  
- Changing to a percentage of tax revenue to GDP will lead to changes in income in the 
same direction on defense and national security with 0.271%  
 
3. Tax revenues and expenditures on education  
 
INV = -0.005 + 0.121 * VF 
 
  According to the regression equation between the two variables is a positive 
linear relationship: the change to a percentage of tax revenue to GDP, public spending 
on education will change in the same direction as 0.121%. 
 
4. Tax revenues and expenditures for health  
 
Ch_S = 0.259 + 0.019 * VF 
 
  The regression equation between the two variables is a positive linear 
relationship: the change to a percentage of tax revenue to GDP, public spending on 
education will change in the same direction as the 0.019 %.  
 
5. Tax revenues and expenditures for culture  
 
Ch_C = -0.005 + 0.030 * VF 
 
  Estimated parameters of the equation shows that the change to a percentage of 
revenues in GDP, expenditure on culture will change in the same direction by 0.03%.  
 
6. Income tax and social security charges  
 
Ch_Asig = 0.097 + 0.205 * VF 
 
  Analyzing regression equation of income tax and social security charges to say 
that the change to a percentage of revenues in GDP, expenditure on social security will 
hange in the same direction to 0.205%.  c
  
7. Tax revenues and public spending and development services  
 
SDP = 0.016 + 0.033 * VF 
 
  Estimated parameters of the equation shows that the change to a percentage of 
revenues in GDP, expenditure on public services and development will change in the 
same direction to 0.033%.  
 
8. Tax revenues and expenditures for economic action  
 
AEC = 0.311 + 0.226 * VF 
 
  This result shows that the change to a percentage of revenues in GDP, 
expenditure on economic activities will change in the same direction as 0.226%.  
  Graphically, the regression equations between different categories of 
expenditure and fiscal revenue can be represented in figure 1. 
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 Source: Own calculations using Eviews program and empirical data from Statistical Yearbook 
of Romania (www.insse.ro) 
 
Figure 1. Regression equations between different categories of public expenditure and tax 
revenue 
 
  The coefficient of determination for regressions of the above means that:  
-  11.7% of the variance in overall spending on public services is explained by 
changes in tax revenue; 
-  82.3% of the variance in national defence and security spending is explained 
by changes in tax revenue ; 
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-  49.9% of the variation in education spending is explained by changes in tax 
revenue; 
-  50.7% of the variation in health spending is explained by changes in tax 
revenue; 
-  71.8% of the variation in expenditure for culture is explained by the variation 
in tax revenue; 
-  31.8% of the variance in social security expenditure is explained by changes in 
tax revenue; 
-  40.2% of the variation in services and public development expenditure is 
explained by changes in tax revenue; 
-  45% of the variation in expenditures for economic action is explained by 
changes in tax revenue. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Given the results of the above analysis we can conclude that in Romania, in the 
race to the bottom amid the global fiscal competition, taxpayer welfare services are 
aimed directly subcontractor (expenditures on education increased by 0.121% as a 
percentage of GDP 1% increase in fiscal revenues, health expenditures by 0.019% and 
culture by 0.03%, provided that these changes are explained in more than 50% percent 
of the variation in tax revenue), while other areas are services aimed at suprafurnizate 
(such as economic actions spending rising by 0.226% at a 1% increase in fiscal 
revenues or expenditures for national defence and security increased by 0.271%). 
  Providing public services in Romania can be explained in terms of policy 
instruments used by various parties that have ruled the country during the period under 
review, such as social insurance are explained only at a rate of 31.8% of fiscal policy 
changes or the general public services, whose variation is explained only 11.7% of the 
variation rate of income tax.  
  For more relevant results in this respect, it requires a more detailed analysis, 
taking into account the degree of involvement of the political factor in economic life. 
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